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ABSTRACT: Borderline cases of vague predicates are often characterized with the 
help of a definiteness operator. Although such operators can certainly contribute 
to the solution of the problem of vagueness, they may also generate unexpected 
consequences. Either borderlineness is identified implicitly with a well-defined 
range of cases, or borderline cases are seen as being definitely borderline. In this 
paper I argue that we can avoid these consequences by providing an asymmetric 
definition of borderline cases.
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I. Introduction
Recent theories of vagueness tend to assume, almost routinely, that the 
most efficient method for providing a suitable formal characterization of 
borderline cases is the method of definitization. The primary purpose in 
introducing a definiteness operator, D, into the object language, is to make 
possible a classificatory distinction between different application cases of 
vague predicates. In contrast to obvious cases where F definitely applies 
or definitely does not apply to a, borderline cases are usually thought of 
as those in which F exhibits a certain kind of classificatory uncertainty 
with respect to a. The method of definitization is indeed quite general. It 
is applied more or less invariantly in otherwise incompatible approaches 
to vagueness.1
1 In this paper, I will focus only on the most general theoretical consequences of 
definitization. Though followers of supervaluationism, epistemicism, contextualism and 
other approaches differ considerably in the strategies they introduce the definiteness opera-
tor, I will not analyse the individual differences. On my view, the question of the relation 
between borderline cases and definiteness is independent enough from particular theories 
to constitute an autonomous methodological problem.
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One can easily explain why the presence of a formal tool like D is 
supposed to be essential for the characterization of borderlineness. Just 
imagine someone trying to say what it is to be a borderline case without 
exploiting the benefits of the definiteness operator. The most natural option 
for her would be to claim that a borderline case is an object a to which nei-
ther F nor ¬F applies.2 That claim would be inappropriate for at least two 
reasons. First, if F is a partially defined predicate, then, per definitionem, 
there must be an a to which neither F nor ¬F applies. As an illustration, let 
us introduce the predicate nice* in the following way: (i) a whole number 
n is nice*, if n is greater than 15, and (ii) a whole number n is not nice*, 
if n is less than 15.3 Since nice* remains undefined for the number 15, it 
is not misleading to conclude that neither nice* nor ¬nice* applies to it. 
This might suggest that number 15 is a borderline case of nice*. But it is 
not so. It is merely an undefined case for our sharply bounded artificial 
predicate nice*. So it can be seen that the proposed account is not specific 
enough to allow us to distinguish between borderline cases and cases of un-
definedness. Second, in claiming that the classificatory uncertainty in the 
borderline region emerges from the inapplicability of F and ¬F, one also 
implicitly claims that borderline cases of F are incompatible with both 
positive and negative application cases of F – and that sounds quite im-
plausible. Even if it is uncertain whether F applies to a or not, there is no 
in principle reason to reject categorically the classification of a either as F 
or as ¬F. Uncertainty with respect to the correct application conditions of 
F does not exclude the possibility that a could be classified as being either 
F or ¬F. To think otherwise would be to put forth a rather idiosyncratic 
concept of borderlineness.
The arguments above provide at least a partial explanation for why it 
is folly to try to characterize borderline cases without using the definite-
ness operator. In order to show how we can accommodate classificatory 
uncertainties to our systematic reasoning, we need first identify positive 
and negative cases where the application of vague predicates does not 
pose any problem. Such a task can be easily accomplished by using stand-
ard logical tools. But when we begin to articulate how positive and nega-
tive cases relate to borderline cases, the method of definitization proves to 
be unavoidable.
Although the introduction of a definiteness operator can certainly 
contribute to the solution of the classificatory problem of vague predi-
2 Such a view is rarely advanced in contemporary debates over borderlineness, but 
one example is to be found in Horwich (2005). 
3 The example originates from Fine (1975). In that paper, Fine holds that predicates 
like nice* are deficient in meaning and that is enough for them to be vague. Tye (1997) 
seems to agree, but see Barnett (2010) for an argument against Fine’s account.
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cates, it may also generate new difficulties. The potential difficulties 
seem, in general, to be independent from the informal specification of 
the operator in question. Some hold that ‘definitely’ should be taken as a 
primitive notion.4 If this is the case, then we cannot explain its meaning 
in terms of more fundamental notions. Rather, we come to understand it 
in such a way that we recognize the logical rules that govern its use. Oth-
ers argue that ‘definitely’ must be regarded as a semantic-ontic notion.5 
On this view, there are sufficient semantic and factual conditions for the 
application of the operator. If a is definitely F, then the linguistic conven-
tions determine conditions for the application of F and the facts about a 
determine that these conditions are met. A further idea is that ‘definitely’ 
requires an epistemic explanation. According to this explanation, the ef-
fects of the definiteness operator are epistemically similar to the effects of 
the knowledge operator: F may be thought to apply definitely to a when 
there are no specific obstacles to knowing that a is F.6
One claim of the present paper is that these informal specifications 
are much less significant to the vexed problem of borderline cases as it is 
usually assumed. The definiteness operator generates difficulties largely 
independently from the way in which it is introduced into the object lan-
guage. That is why it appears to give rise to similar complications in most 
extant theories of vagueness.
II. Unexpected Consequences of D-Introduction
One natural-seeming assumption with regard to D-introduction is that in 
its unconstrained form the rule  A → DA is invalid. Borderline applica-
tion cases appear to provide rather clear counterexamples to this rule. 
If Fa is an instance of A and F exhibits classificatory uncertainty with 
respect to a, then, obviously, it is fallacious to infer from A to DA. So 
presumably the rule  A → DA is valid only in cases where F applies ob-
viously to a even in the D-free object language. There may be more than 
one correct answer to the question of why paradigmatic vague predicates 
like ‘bald’, ‘heap’, or ‘rich’ must have such obvious application cases. 
Perhaps the lexical meaning of F would remain essentially incomplete 
or imperfect without the existence of obvious application cases. Perhaps 
there are logical principles which require that F be applicable to certain 
4 Field (2001).
5 McGee and McLaughlin (1994).
6 See Williamson (2004). It should be mentioned, though, that according to the stand-
ard epistemic view not all kinds of epistemic obstacles are removable in vague contexts, so 
‘It is known that’ and ‘It is definitely the case that’ are conceived of as distinct operators 
with partly overlapping functions.
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objects without classificatory uncertainty. Or it can be that the existence 
of obvious cases is a result of a certain set of epistemic processes. Very 
likely, one of these conceptions is correct, but we do not really need to 
know which one. As an illustration, let us suppose that poor Harry has 
zero hairs on his head. Suppose furthermore that he is an adult male who 
has lost all of his hairs because of the natural process of aging. Then, I 
think, it would be quite pointless to debate that the predicate ‘bald’ obvi-
ously applies to him. Given this fact, it would be also pointless to debate 
that he can be called definitely bald. This indicates that no matter what 
view one holds about the possible sources of the existence of the obvious 
application cases of ‘bald’, there will be a strong agreement that Harry is 
a definitely bald person. The example seems to generalize to many other 
vague expressions. Predicates like ‘heap’, ‘rich’, or ‘old’ are similar to 
‘bald’ in that they also may be associated with discourse contexts where 
the correctness of their application seems to be beyond any reasonable 
doubt. Hence the following principle may be established for this family 
of predicates:
CONSTRAINED D-INTRODUCTION.  A → DA is valid if and 
only if D-free instances of A qualify as obvious application cases.7
Before the acceptability of CONSTRAINED D-INTRODUCTION can be 
discussed properly, a short clarification is in order. Nothing has been said 
so far on the agent-relative conditions of being obvious. What does it 
mean that F applies obviously to a? Is ‘obviously’ related to the linguis-
tic/epistemic capacities of a single agent or a particular community? It is 
advisable here to follow an indirect strategy and say that if there is at least 
one ideally competent agent in a community c to whom the F-ness of a 
seems not immediately evident, then in c, F does not apply obviously to 
a. When there is no such an agent in c, the obviousness condition should 
be interpreted as automatically satisfied. For our purposes, the notion ide-
ally competent agent’ denotes an agent who has full linguistic competence 
with respect to the meaning of F and has the epistemic capacity to gather 
and understand all F-relevant information about a. This condition, as it is 
stated here, is far from being extremely stringent, since the vast majority 
of adult language users may be regarded as ideally competent with respect 
to obvious application cases of vague predicates in their own linguistic 
community.
7 The proposed constraint on the D-introduction rule should be interpreted again in a 
theory-neutral way. In spite of the great differences in their conceptual machinery, nearly 
all extant theories of vagueness admit, in their own way, that there exist obvious applica-
tion cases of vague predicates. 
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Of course, it may be doubted that this is the right way to constrain D-
introduction.8 Even the theoretical legitimacy of the notion of obvious ap-
plication case may be questioned.9 But we should not forget the theoretical 
role D-introduction is intended to play in the solution of the classificatory 
problem of vague predications. If we rejected the constrained version of 
A → DA, borderline cases of application would be characterizable only 
in terms of F and ¬F, and this kind of characterization, as we have seen, 
is clearly untenable.
It should be added, however, that beyond its theoretical benefits D-in-
troduction has also considerable disadvantages. Borderline application 
cases are often not only informally characterized, but also defined, in a 
contrastive fashion, with the help of the definiteness operator. The most 
preferred version of the definition states that a is a borderline case of F if 
and only if neither F nor ¬F applies definitely to it. By employing seman-
tic descent, a more concise form is attainable:
DEFINITION OF BORDERLINE CASE. An object a is borderline F 
if and only if it is neither DF nor D¬F.10
One apparent disadvantage of this definition is that it implicitly entails a 
sharp classificatory line between borderline and obvious application cases 
of F. Borderline cases are directly contrasted with obviously positive and 
negative application cases, and the resulting tripartite classification does 
not seem to allow for any kind of overlap between them. In this way, the 
definition creates the impression that being a borderline F is a sharply 
delineated property or status which is incompatible both with being DF 
and with being D¬F. But that clashes with our original intentions. What 
we were after was a suitable formal characterization of the classificatory 
uncertainty exhibited by borderline predications. Instead of this, we have 
now arrived at an eliminative definition that identifies borderlineness with 
a well-defined range of cases.
The usual and probably the only available response to this unexpected 
difficulty is to deny that the definition draws a sharp line between border-
line and non-borderline predications. One might argue that, for some rea-
son, D-introduction is not an appropriate tool for eliminating entirely the 
vagueness of F. For example, if in vague predications D functions merely 
as an operator of contrast intensifier, then it may not be unreasonable to 
 8 An alternative account explicates the definiteness operator on the model of the ne-
cessity operator. On this account, D-introduction may be constrained in terms of accessible 
possible worlds. See, for example, Gaifman (2010).
 9 Braun and Sider (2007).
10 Cf., among others, Gaifman (2010) and Bobzien (2010).
202 Prolegomena 11 (2) 2012
introduce into the formal system a new classificatory set of cases, namely 
borderline cases of being DF/D¬F. After this step, there remains no room 
for making a sharp discrimination between borderline and non-borderline 
cases of being F. But the difficulty reappears in the same form, since the 
introduction of borderline cases of being DF/D¬F induces a sharp classifi-
catory line between cases of being DF/D¬F and borderline cases of being 
DF/D¬F. Again the usual response is to run an iterative process and permit the 
existence of borderline cases of being DF/D¬F. Given that the process does 
not apparently terminate, one obtains infinitely many higher-order border-
line cases of being DF/D¬F.
Even if this conception of infinite higher-order vagueness is coherent 
in itself, one might doubt whether it provides an adequate solution to the 
difficulty arising from the definition of borderline case.11 The troubling 
factor is that each member of the hierarchy of iterated cases involves inev-
itably a significant weakening of the definitizing effect of D. The first step 
in the iteration process implies already the presence of some uncertainty 
in predications containing DF/D¬F. This is, at least, controversial. Recall 
that in our earlier example the predicate ‘is definitely bald’ proved to be 
indisputably applicable to Harry. If it turned out that Harry represents, 
contrary to our deep convictions, a borderline case of definite baldness, 
then this would show that ‘bald’ cannot be applied with certainty even 
under maximally appropriate application conditions. The standard con-
ception of higher-order vagueness does not exclude this counterintuitive 
possibility, so it would probably not get us out of our present difficulty.
A further and perhaps even more peculiar difficulty following from 
the definition above concerns the existence of definite borderlineness. We 
assumed earlier that D-introduction for A is valid if and only if D-free in-
stances of A qualify as obvious application cases. On that natural assump-
tion, DF applies to a only in cases where there is no reasonable ground 
for doubting that a is F. The same holds for D¬F. But note that, according 
to their definition, the classificatory status of borderline cases is not dif-
ferent in this respect. If a is neither DF nor D¬F, then we have no reason-
able ground for doubting its borderline status. Thus D-introduction must 
also be valid for borderline predications, and, as a surprising consequence, 
each borderline case has to be conceived as a definite borderline case. That 
11 It is worth mentioning that Raffman (2010), Wright (2011) and others argue per-
suasively against the coherence of the notion of non-terminating higher-order vagueness. 
The main point of their criticism is that, on purely conceptual grounds, we cannot have a 
stable idea of the phenomenon to which the notion would apply. Wright even goes so far as 
to state that higher-order vagueness “is a fantasy”. Such an objection seems to me relevant 
and well-founded, but I will not argue that here.
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is, it seems that after endorsing CONSTRAINED D-INTRODUCTION and 
DEFINITION OF BORDERLINE CASE we have no choice but to accept the 
rule  (¬DFa & ¬D¬Fa) → D(¬DFa & ¬D¬Fa). With this enforced step 
we end again in a situation in which all attempts at a formal rendering of 
the uncertainty of borderline predications seem to be doomed to failure.
III. Is There a Way Out?
The difficulties we have just discussed arise from the combination of two 
general insights: (i) the uncertainty of borderline predications cannot be 
properly formalized in a system in which a suitably constrained form of 
D-introduction is not valid, and (ii) borderline cases of F have to be de-
fined as being neither DF nor D¬F. As we have already seen, conceptual 
considerations strongly suggest that (i) is correct independently of the in-
formal interpretation of the definiteness operator. So if we want to make 
any progress, we must revise (ii). It is not easy to accomplish this task, 
however, since (ii) also appears intuitively accurate.
My proposal is that, at the present level of discussion, we should inter-
pret (ii) as a kind of asymmetric definition. While there is nothing wrong 
in saying that a is a borderline case of F if it is neither DF nor D¬F, it may 
be doubted whether the reverse direction of the condition relation holds.
Let us divide the diagnosis into two parts. Notice, first, that from the 
fact that a is not DF, one cannot infer to as object-language status with 
respect to being F, because being not DF is not a firm basis to support 
any such conclusion. Perhaps a can be classified as a borderline case of F. 
Perhaps it can be acceptably classified as F. It may even turn out that it can 
be considered to be ¬F. Unfortunately, there is no known principled way 
to decide which of the candidate classifications is the ultimately correct 
one. The situation is analogical when a is not D¬F: on this basis alone, 
one cannot ascertain the correct classificatory status of a. If this is so, no 
stable classificatory judgment can be derived from the fact that a is neither 
DF nor D¬F. This means, in a more formal way, that BFa → (¬DFa & 
¬D¬Fa) but (¬DFa & ¬D¬Fa) →⁄      BFa, where BFa stands for a borderline 
case of F.12
Notice, second, that we must not remain entirely silent about the for-
mal properties of borderline cases even when we read the asymmetric 
definition from right to left. Although the classificatory status of a proves 
12 Perhaps (¬DFa & ¬D¬Fa) → (Fa  ¬Fa  BFa) is a valid derivation. That would 
provide further support to our observation that from ¬DFa & ¬D¬Fa no stable judgment 
can be derived concerning the classificatory status of a.
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to be unascertainable on this reading, one is still allowed to adopt a mo-
dal perspective. The core idea here is that in the borderline region only 
non-factual modal judgments can be regarded as entirely unobjectionable. 
In particular, in cases where a is neither DF nor D¬F all that can reason-
ably be asserted positively about a is that it might be F, or that it might 
be ¬F.13 Such non-factual judgements can even be made simultaneously 
in the same discourse situation. Let us take the example of Jerry, who is 
claimed to be neither definitely bald nor definitely not bald. According to 
the present proposal, we can then confidently and simultaneously assert 
that Jerry might be bald and that Jerry might be not bald. The emphasis 
lies on the non-factuality of these assertions: in making might-claims we 
leave open the question concerning the factual relation between Jerry and 
the property of baldness. Speaking in this manner seems unavoidable if 
we do not wish to assign a sharply delineated factual status to Jerry be-
tween baldness and non-baldness.
This latter point is of considerable importance. A quick comparison 
with close alternatives may help to reveal the tenability of the present ap-
proach.
Absolute agnosticism maintains that in the borderline region judg-
ments about baldness are impossible. According to this radical view, even 
ideally competent agents are unable to tell whether Jerry is bald or not 
bald.14 The scope of the ignorance is assumed to extend also to the prop-
erty of being a borderline case of baldness. Thus, it is not only the case 
that we cannot tell whether Jerry is bald or not bald, we cannot even tell 
whether Jerry is borderline bald or not borderline bald. This type of abso-
lute agnosticism might be criticized on the ground that it sees borderline 
cases as a sharply separable kind: borderline cases are thought to be pre-
cisely those cases in which competent agents cannot make any judgment.
Moderate versions of agnosticism claim only that in the borderline 
region agents are not in a position to make stable judgments about hardly 
classifiable objects. Moderate agnosticists think the characteristic reaction 
to the case of Jerry is something like “a drying of the springs of opinion”.15 
If this is intended to mean that there is a systematic correlation between 
borderline cases and the reaction of withdrawal from judging, then we are 
dangerously close again to positing sharply separated borderline cases. If 
it means something significantly weaker, then moderate agnosticism may 
be very similar, in one respect, to the view presented here.
13 Some theories of modality consider ‘might’ statements factual. So I must admit that 
my proposal is not compatible with all extant views in this research area.
14 The best elaboration of this position is to be found in Bobzien (2010). 
15 The metaphor is taken from Wright (2011).
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An important lesson is that DEFINITION OF BORDERLINE CASE 
should not be understood as a concealed procedure for establishing the 
existence of a third type status between being definitely F and being defi-
nitely not F. Recognizing the asymmetric structure of this definition may 
be a decisive step in that direction. It should be realized that, because of 
the validity of CONSTRAINED D-INTRODUCTION, the left-right direction 
holds without any restriction, but given the irremediable lack of appro-
priate logical and conceptual tools, the right-left direction allows only a 
modally weakened reading.
For the purposes of a formal analysis, this may seem a rather disap-
pointing result. To contend that borderline cases have to be identified in 
part with classificatory possibilities is, after all, to acknowledge that they 
are not fully systematizable. At the same time, the account offered by the 
present proposal is not wholly pessimistic. It shows that an asymmetric 
definition does not eliminate the uncertainty characteristic of borderline 
cases. It also makes clear that a suitably constrained D-introduction need 
not necessarily involve a sharp classificatory line between different ap-
plication cases of vague predicates. A fortunate side-effect of this is that 
one should no longer have to worry about the difficulties associated with 
higher-order vagueness and definite borderline cases.16,17
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